We construct a gravity model of worldwide foreign direct investment stock (FDI) in order to study the effect of religion on FDI allocation. We establish empirically that both bilateral religious similarity and bilateral religious diversity foster FDI at the country pair level. These apparently contradicting results confirm an empirical puzzle that has already emerged in the literature, particularly in the case of trade in goods. We investigate whether the answer to this puzzle could lie on the fact that the effect of these two variables play for different types of countries, depending on the level of efficiency of their institutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the literature in international economics has been increasingly concerned about uncovering the cultural determinants of economics exchanges. Behind this empirical inquiry is the idea that culture may be thought of as a comprehensive system of moral values and behavioural standards that emerges in order to foster trust and economic cooperation in human communities (Henrich et al. 2004) . If the purpose of culture is to promote proximity and trust among individuals and if, as Kenneth Arrow wrote, 'every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust' (Arrow 1972, p. 357) , then culture is likely to have a significant impact on economic exchanges. This issue has generally been addressed by testing for the significance of several indicators of cultural proximity in economic models of international transactions. Among potential vectors of cultural proximity, religion has received some particular attention. This is both because of data availability and of religion's pervasive influence on the definition of the moral values and behavioural standard that are specific to any given culture, an idea which traces back to Weber (1904) , and has recently been investigated in empirical work such as Guiso et al. (2003) .
Typically, religion has entered empirical economic analysis in two different ways. On the one hand, it has been investigated whether more religious proximity between two countries is associated with a rise in the volume of trade between them. Guo (2004) , Helble (2007) and Guiso et al. (2009) find this to be the case. Guiso et al. (2009) show that the effect of religious proximity is further strengthened if one focuses on trade in differentiated goods.
Because trade in differentiated goods is thought to be much more trust intensive than trade in homogeneous goods, the authors interpret this as evidence that the effect of religious proximity on economic exchanges is mediated by an increase in the level of bilateral trust. On the other hand, some other empirical studies in international economics like Helble (2007) and Dolansky and Alon (2008) have followed the track opened by Barro and McCleary (2003) who established a robust empirical correlation between the level of religious diversity within a country and its economic growth prospects. These authors find that more religiously diverse country pairs generally sustain higher levels of economic exchanges. The theoretical rationale as to why this should be the case globally revolves around the fact that more religiously diverse countries should be more open-minded and more accustomed to facing and managing competing points of views. As such, they should be less risk averse, so that they would tend to be less reluctant to engage in economic transactions that involve less trust but are mutually beneficial.
At the end of the day, the current literature leaves us with one puzzling empirical result: at the country pair level, both religious similarity and religious diversity are found to foster trade. Helble (2007) finds the effect of religious diversity to be consistently stronger than the effect of religious proximity. He concludes that 'a common religion may favor trade, but the presence of many religions should be clearly preferred' (Helble 2007, p. 410) .
The primary goal of this paper is twofold:
1. To see whether those apparently conflicting results can extend to the case of another type of economic transaction: foreign direct investment (FDI). There are two main reasons for the focus of this paper on FDI. First, an FDI is no more than an investor deciding to transfer some capital in a foreign country, anticipating that he will be able to repatriate his profits.
This type of long term investment should therefore be particularly vulnerable to any form of mistrust, for it can imply high sunk costs. This means that if religion really has an effect on economic exchanges through trust, it should reveal itself particularly strongly for FDI.
Second, while some papers have already studied the effect of religion on trade in a systematic fashion, this has not been the case for FDI.
2. As it turns out that this empirical puzzle also applies to FDI, we build on a theoretical framework initially developed by Greif (1994 Greif ( , 2006 in order to propose and put to test an explanation for this result. We argue that religious similarity is a natural and non costly signal that helps breeding trust and promoting economic exchanges for countries that have relatively weak institutions. In these countries, national institutions tend to inconsistently define and protect property rights. Religious proximity thus acts as a convenient manner to deal with uncertainty, as it provides both parties with an informal way to insure that trust will be reciprocated and that free-riding types of behaviour will be prevented. Conversely, religious proximity loses its comparative advantage for breeding trust and securing property rights to formal institutions in countries that effectively have the means to incur the costs of making them work efficiently. In the more institutionally developed countries, religious proximity should thus have less of an influence on the volume of economic exchanges.
In addition, the institutionally developed countries are also the ones that are the more likely to extract the benefits, if any, that arise from hosting a high number of religious communities. Indeed, a high level of religious diversity in weak institutions countries can foster tensions in community relations rather than open-mindedness and innovation. Hence, contrary to what we expect for religious proximity, the positive impact of religious diversity on the volume of economic exchanges should be stronger for countries that are highly institutionally developed. All in all, our hypothesis boils down to saying that if both religious proximity and religious diversity foster economic exchanges, it may be because their effect plays for different types of countries, depending on the level of efficiency of their formal institutions.
As a secondary research issue, we also note that the concept of religious similarity that we use in this paper does not allow to distinguish between the potentially different effects of hosting a common religious majority or a common religious minority. A country pair may be considered more religiously proximate both because it has a common religious majority or a common religious minority. Distinguishing between those two can turn out to be important. Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Helble (2007) show that ethnic and religious cross border minorities are very efficient at fostering international trade. We thus try to explore whether this is also the case for FDI stock.
In terms of methodology, we use a dataset constructed by McCleary and Barro (2006) which provides the share of the population affiliated with each of 7 major religious denominations in 192 countries to construct indicators of religious proximity, religious diversity, common religious majority and common religious minority at the country pair level.
We then construct a gravity model of FDI and try to test our hypothesis by running controlled regressions of worldwide bilateral FDI stock on our 4 religious variables, interacting them when needed with indicators of the efficiency of the institutions in the considered countries.
Note that the focus of this paper is on estimating the impact of our religious variables on worldwide FDI stock allocation, without distinguishing between each actual religious denomination. We think that this approach is appropriate because it sidesteps the difficulty of having to state hypothesis about the relative efficiency of different religious denominations for promoting interpersonal trust and economic exchanges. Rather, it is much simpler to stick to the functionalist hypothesis that any religion is a comprehensive system of moral values and behavioural standards that emerges in order to foster trust and economic cooperation at the community level.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly provides some background about how religion, institutions and trust may be important for promoting economic exchanges, with some special focus on FDI. Section III describes the religious variables and the identification strategy. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. RELIGION, INSTITUTIONS, TRUST AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES: SOME BACKGROUND
In this section, we first review the existing evidence on the potential role of religion for promoting interpersonal trust, securing property rights and promoting economic exchanges. We then develop a theory as to how religion may interact with the quality of formal institutions in order to foster trust and economic exchanges. We finish by presenting a very simple model explaining how trust may enter FDI allocation decisions.
Why should religion matter for trust and economic exchanges?
The idea that culture may be thought of as a comprehensive system of moral values and behavioural standards that emerges in order to foster interpersonal trust and cooperation at the community level has been first proposed in the field of evolutionary biology (Sober and Wilson 1998, Richerson and . Human societies rest on the capacity of individuals to cooperate with one another in order to achieve mutually beneficial goals. However, those who commit themselves to cooperating often take the risk that others may choose a freeriding type of behaviour in which they benefit from cooperation without incurring its cost. In this prisoner's dilemma type of social interactions, a cooperative equilibrium can only be sustained at the society's level if individuals have good reasons ex ante to trust others, i.e. to believe that they will keep up with their cooperative commitments. The essence of what we call 'culture' would be to provide individuals with moral values that prevent free-riding types of behaviour and with behavioural standards that help individuals form an expectation about the probability that such behaviour will be undertaken. In the field of economics, Henrich et al. (2004) have begun to test empirically this hypothesis. It has also inspired several empirical works investigating the role of culture in fostering interpersonal trust and promoting economic growth (Algan and Cahuc 2010) or economic development (Tabellini 2010 ).
Among cultural vectors, religion is thought to be one powerful vehicle for inculcating specific moral values and behavioural standards in a group of individuals (Durkheim 1912 , Wilson 2002 . The moral values that any religion promotes are backed up by the believer's faith in their sacrality, while the behavioural standards that it advocates constitute an implicit and community specific language which breeds cultural proximity and trust between individuals (Iannaccone 1998). Even in highly developed countries where religion generally plays less of a direct social role, the moral values and behavioural standards that it advocates continue to influence the way individuals tend to manage their daily interactions (Kaufmann 1997 ).
When it comes to economic transactions, there are numerous ways through which a party can try to free-ride on his counterpart, so that trust should be an important element of any commercial transaction. Several case studies like Ensminger (1997) , Richman (2002) or Greif (2006) shed light on religion's role for breeding trust and promoting economic exchanges between trading partners. This qualitative material begins to be supplemented by some quantitative analysis (Michalopoulos et al. 2010) . Empirically, however, it is difficult to claim that any statistical association between religion and the volume of economic exchanges is mediated by an increase in trust, for it is subject to the difficulty of gathering reliable data on bilateral trust levels. Guiso et al. (2009) directly address this difficultly by using survey answers to compute a matrix of bilateral trust levels for 18 countries mostly located in the European Union. They obtain that 'religious similarity has a positive impact on trust:
compared to a case where no common religion is shared, a match where 90% of the citizens share the same religion (e.g., Italy and Spain) raises trust by 15 percentage points (corresponding to 40% of its standard deviation)' (Guiso et al. 2009 (Guiso et al. , p. 1112 . They then show that the variance in bilateral trust levels which is explained by religious proximity has a significant impact on the volume of trade that occurs between European countries.
How should religion interact with the quality of formal institutions for promoting trust
and economic exchanges? North (1990, p. 3) defines institutions as 'the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. Within any society, North explains, this bundle of rules and constraints is devised in order to prevent free-riding types of behaviour and promote trust in social and economic interactions. In the view of evolutionary biology, religious moral values and behavioural standards are typically the kind of rules that emerge spontaneously in a society in order to prevent free riding and promote cooperation. These rules can thus be considered as 'institutions' in their own right. However, economists have been traditionally more concerned about studying the impact of another kind of rules and constraints. Those rules and constraints, let us call them 'formal institutions', do not emerge spontaneously but are the result of a procedure which organises those rules in a hierarchical system that we call the 'law'. Roughly speaking, what distinguishes those juridical rules from the cultural or religious ones is that those who break them systematically incur the risk that somebody asks for the enforcement of the rule by a third party (i.e. the police) to the judiciary. In the case of FDI, studies by Wei (2000) and Stein and Daude (2001) show that bad quality of formal institutions in the host country is highly detrimental to its FDI prospects.
Focusing on the case of international trade, Greif (1994 Greif ( 2006 shows both theoretically and empirically that religious norms and behavioural standards have been relied upon very early in history in order to promote trust and cooperation between trading partners of the same religious community. The invention of what we call 'formal institutions' is in fact quite recent and is the result, Greif argues, of the progress of communication and transport technologies which allowed profitable large scale economic exchanges between different communities to occur. The fixed and variable cost of establishing and making those formal institutions work efficiently is very high, but if done properly, it permits to prevent free-riding types of behaviour more efficiently and enables to breed trust and cooperation even between communities that do not share the same culture or religion. As a result, the role of religious proximity for breeding trust and promoting economic exchanges should be decreasing with the efficiency of a country's formal institutions.
If verified empirically, this reasoning could provide an explanation for the puzzling empirical result that both religious similarity and religious diversity seem to have a positive impact on bilateral trade volumes. The effect of these two variables could in fact play for different types of countries, depending on the level of efficiency of their formal institutions.
Thus, religious similarity should play more of a role for promoting economic exchanges in countries that have relatively weak formal institutions. Conversely, it is also likely that the benefits, if any, from hosting a wide variety of religious communities in terms of increased open-mindedness and decreased risk aversion will only arise in countries that have the means to ensure that inter-community relationships goes smoothly, that is in countries that have relatively strong formal institutions. Guo (2004) investigates empirically the role of religious similarity for fostering trade between the United States, China and their respective trading partners. He notices that 'the effect of religious similarity on foreign trade becomes less important with greater per capita GNP' (Guo 2004, p. 804) . Given that the efficiency of a country's formal institutions is highly correlated to its GDP per capita (Stein and Daude 2001) , the above hypothesis could also provide an explanation for this kind of results.
How does trust enter FDI stock allocation decisions 1 ?
Let us consider a party A who has a long term investment opportunity in a foreign country with party B. In order to find out if this long term investment opportunity has a positive net present value, A has to incur an investigation cost c. After this cost is paid, A knows with certainty if his opportunity is profitable (Vh > 0, with probability p) or not (Vl < 0, with probability 1 -p).
If the net present value of the long term investment project happens to be positive (i.e.
Vh > 0), A can enter into a contractual relationship with B. In doing so, however, A assumes that B will behave according to the terms of the contract, that is in a cooperative fashion. This is because once the investment decision has been taken, B can always choose to cheat on A and prevent him from repatriating his profits and selfishly hoarding all of the Vh quantity.
Knowing this risk ex ante, A tends to attribute a probability π to this event. Hence, the ex ante payoff P of A is given by the following quantity:
Subsequently, A will pay the investigation cost c and eventually take advantage of this long term investment opportunity (if it is profitable, i.e. if Vh > 0) if and only if the quantity P is positive. This means that no matter how big the net present value of the long term investment opportunity Vh may be, and no matter how small the investigation cost c is, if the interpersonal trust level (1 -π ) between A and B is sufficiently low, the long term investment opportunity will never be investigated and hence never undertaken. The fundamental question is then to investigate how A will frame his expectation about the probability π that B will defect once he decided to invest. Within our theoretical framework, both religious proximity and the quality of formal institutions in the host country are criteria that should decrease A's expectation about the probability π that B will ultimately choose a free-riding type of behaviour. In addition, the conscious or unconscious prominence of religious proximity as such a criterion for A should be decreasing with the quality of formal institutions in B's country. Head and Ries (2008) (Head and Ries 2008, p. 5 ). In such a setting however, the theoretical role of religious proximity for promoting interpersonal trust, reducing inspection costs and promoting FDI remains the same, even more so that most M&A are indeed friendly rather than hostile.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Data and religious variables
Our data on bilateral FDI stock is taken from the 2006 OECD database. between two countries as the empirical probability that two randomly chosen individuals in each country will share the same religion. Let us call this variable Religious Similarity. We compute it by taking the product of the fraction of individuals in country i and in country j who are affiliated to religion r and by summing up across all religions r. We leave the categories recorded as 'no religion' or 'other affiliation' out of the calculation. According to our argument about how religion should impact trust and FDI, including these heterogeneous categories doesn't make much sense and may introduce noise in the variable's calculation.
Hence, we calculate bilateral religious similarity according to the following formula 2 :
According to this definition, a country pair can be considered relatively more religiously proximate both because it has a common religious majority or a common religious minority. This definition is practical, but it prevents from distinguishing between the potentially different effects of hosting a common religious majority or a common religious minority on trust and FDI: is the magnitude of religion's effect strengthened when two countries have an increasing part of their population which is affiliated to the same religion, or are religious minorities also efficient at sustaining cross border trust and promoting FDI?
Indeed, Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Helble (2007) find that ethnic and religious cross border minorities are also very efficient at promoting international trade. In order to disentangle between those two options, we compute two dummy variables along with the Religious Similarity variable. One is for two countries sharing a common religious majority (Common Maj. Religion), i.e. more than 50% of the population is affiliated to the same religion in both countries. The other is for two countries sharing a common religious minority (Common Min. Religion), i.e. between 5 and 50% of the population is affiliated to the same religion in both countries.
Finally, we also compute an indicator of religious diversity in both countries. We calculate the Herfindahl index of religion in each country (i.e. an indicator of the concentration of each country's religious market) and take 1 minus this quantity. Then, we compute the product of the two indicators for each couple of countries. We obtain a variable which grows to one when both countries tend to host a higher number of religions with their market shares being distributed as evenly as possible. Hence, religious diversity is calculated according to the following formula 3 :
Most empirical works which included a religious proximity variable as a control in their estimations so far assumed that religion should be controlled for because people generally exchange with whom they can understand and look like them. However, religious diversity has also received some attention from empiricists. Barro and McCleary (2003) show that more religiously diverse countries have better economic growth prospects. Helble (2007) and Dolansky and Alon (2008) find that more religiously diverse country pairs generally sustain higher levels of economic exchanges. We include this variable in the analysis in order to see if we can reproduce this result in the context of FDI.
Identification strategy
We estimate a gravity model of bilateral FDI stock. The use of the gravity model to estimate bilateral FDI stock traces back to Eaton and Tamura (1994) . It generally fits the data very well. Kleiner and Toubal (2010) provide a theoretical framework for analysing this empirical success. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) analyse and propose convenient corrections for the most frequent errors that are made in empirical works which estimate gravity models.
In this paper, we do not resort to the OLS estimation technique. This is because resorting to a linear model for estimating FDI stock implies that the left-hand side variable should be loglinearized. However, a lot of country pairs do not share FDI stock. Those zero observations are then often dropped out of the dataset. About half of the observations in our database are recorded as zero, so that the selection bias in this case is likely to be substantial. In order to cater with this issue, some authors estimate the model using ln(α + fdi) as the dependent variable, with α being a small quantity comprised between 0 and 1. However, FDI are generally reported in millions of USD, which results in introducing a significant bias in the data.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point at another important issue with log-linearized estimation techniques. They show that because the expected value of a logarithm is not equal to the logarithm of the expected value (i.e. E(ln y) ≠ ln E(y)), the estimated coefficients of these models are severely biased in the presence of heteroskedasticity. They use Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate this fact under various patterns of heteroskedasticity. As a convenient alternative, the authors propose to estimate these models using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood technique, whose estimates are not affected by this problem 4 . Since heteroskedasticity is an issue in the OECD dataset (Breusch-Pagan test: p<0.000) and since the Poisson estimation technique is also a natural way to deal with the large number of zero observations in the data, we use this technique in order to estimate our gravity models.
Following Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) , we include country of origin and country of destination fixed effects in all the regressions. This procedure enables us to control properly for all the effects that are specific to any given home and host country in the sample.
As a consequence, we must only include bilateral variables as control variables in the model.
Along with the religious variables, we include 4 standard gravity control variables 5 :
• ln Distance: the logarithm of the distance between the two countries' largest cities, weighted by the share of each city on the total population of the country considered.
• Contiguity: a dummy variable which indicates if the two countries share a common border.
• Common language: a dummy variable which indicates if a common language is spoken at least by 9% of the population in the two countries.
• Colonial relationship: a dummy variable which indicates if the two countries have ever had a colonial link in their past history.
Expressed in more formal terms, we estimate the following gravity model:
where c is a constant, Bil i,j is the set of bilateral controls, Rel i,j is the set of the bilateral religious variables of interest and Home i and Host j are the set of country of origin and country of destination fixed effect. Table 1 presents the results of gravity model (4). Column (1) presents the estimates of the baseline model, i.e. without the religious variables. All bilateral control variables are correctly signed and of the usual magnitude found in this kind of empirical work (for the sake of comparison, see for instance Head and Ries (2008) ). The overall fit of the model is rather high (pseudo R 2 = 0.92). This is mainly due the inclusion of country of origin and country of destination fixed effects, which systematically capture all effects that are particular to the 5 The standard gravity control variables used in this paper are those of the Cepii. The database is freely available at: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm home and the host country for any given country pair. As the contiguity and the colonial relationship variables turn out to be insignificant in this baseline model, we leave them out of the analysis in all subsequent estimations 6 .
IV. RESULTS
Religion and foreign direct investment
In model (2) to (5), we include each religious variable in turn. In line with our hypothesis, we observe that both religious similarity and religious diversity have a positive and strongly significant impact on bilateral FDI stock. This result holds when we include these two variables in the model at the same time (model (6)). It also holds when we include all four religious variables in the model (model (7)). In this case, however, the religious similarity variable is only significant at the 10% level, which is likely to be due to high multicollinearity between this variable and the common religious majority variable (see the data appendix for more details on this point).
In addition, we observe in models (3) and (4) that the coefficients on the common religious majority and the common religious minority variables are positive and statistically significant, respectively at the 1% and 5% levels. This result indicates that along with sharing a religious majority, sharing a religious minority also tends to foster FDI at the country pair level. This result is consistent with what Helble (2007) finds in the case of trade. As one could expect, however, both variables lose all statistical significance when included along with the religious similarity variable in model (7).
[INSERT 
Interacting religion with the quality of formal institutions
So far, we have been able to replicate for FDI the result that seems to emerge from the recent literature on international trade: both a rise in bilateral religious similarity and bilateral religious diversity is associated with a rise in FDI stock prospects. In this section, we try to test whether the answer to this puzzle could lie on the fact that the positive effect of these two variables on bilateral FDI stock plays for different types of countries, depending on the quality level of their formal institutions. We hypothesize that religious similarity should play more of a role for breeding interpersonal trust and promoting FDI in countries that have relatively weak formal institutions. Conversely, we state that if religious diversity can promote bilateral FDI, it should be in countries that have relatively strong formal institutions.
In order to test for this possible explanation, we add in the regressions an interaction term between both indicators of religious similarity and religious diversity and some
indicators of the quality of the formal institutions in the host country 7 . If the above hypothesis is correct, then the coefficients on the interaction terms should be negative for religious similarity and positive for religious diversity. We select two alternative indicators of the quality of formal institutions in the host country to perform this test. As a first indicator, we take a quite broad measure of the quality of formal institutions: the World Bank's general measure of the rule of law. As a second indicator, we take the first and most studied institutional determinant of FDI (Wei 2000) : the level of corruption (with a higher score meaning less corruption). Both of these indicators are taken from Kaufmann et al. (2006) . The results are displayed in Table 2 .
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
We observe that the empirical results are in line with our hypothesis. The coefficients on the interaction terms between religious similarity and the quality of formal institutions are both negative and highly statistically significant. This result means that the role of religious similarity for promoting FDI tends to weaken as the quality of formal institutions in the host country increases. Stated differently, religious similarity can be considered a substitute to the quality of formal institutions in the host country for promoting trust, reducing transaction or inspection costs and, ultimately, fostering FDI.
Conversely, the coefficients on the interaction terms between religious diversity and the quality of formal institutions are both positive and statistically significant, although at a lesser level. This result indicates that the FDI promoting effect of bilateral religious diversity plays relatively more for countries that already exhibit relatively high quality of their formal institutions.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has established empirically that an increase either in bilateral religious similarity or in bilateral religious diversity are both associated with a rise in FDI prospects at the country pair level. This result extends to FDI an empirical puzzle that has already emerged 7 We do not consider the quality of the institutions in the home country because this variable has proven itself to be a poor predictor of outward FDI (see Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) ).
in the case of trade in goods. Remarkably, in all of our estimations, the estimated FDI promoting effect of religious diversity is higher than that of religious similarity, which is consistent with what Helble (2007) finds in the case of trade. Our value added here rests on the fact that we provide and put to test an explanation for this empirical puzzle: religious similarity seems to foster FDI relatively more in countries that exhibit relatively low quality institutions, while the reverse holds for religious diversity.
We can thus endorse Helble's conclusion that 'a common religion may favor [FDI] , but the presence of many religions should be clearly preferred' (Helble 2007, p. 410) .
However, this statement may only be true under an institutional condition, that is, if the quality of formal institutions in the host country is sufficiently high. In order to confirm this result, we thus suggest that future research should explore this explanation whenever such empirical puzzle has appeared, and particularly in the case of trade in goods. All models are estimated through the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood technique. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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